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Abstract:   
Many poor countries are plagued with growth-impeding institutions. We develop a three-
sector general equilibrium model linking economic stagnation in these countries to poor 
export terms of trade. We examine the extent to which changes in the terms of trade 
affect private agents’ incentive to coalesce to oppose the adoption of growth-promoting 
institutions. We show that under certain conditions, below a threshold terms of trade 
level, private agents gain from coalescing to oppose the adoption of growth-promoting 
institutions. Above this threshold, gains from coalescing disappear, fostering institutional 
change. 
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1. Introduction
Why do many commodity exporters tend to have poor economic institutions? This paper
develops a theory that proposes poor terms of trade as an answer. Unlike industrialized
countrieswho are net exporters of manufactures primary commodity exporters typi-
cally occupy the lower rungs of measures of institutional quality like the World Banks
Doing Business Index and Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index. At
the same time the available evidence suggests that historically, primary commodities like
other minimally processed products have poorer terms trade compared to manufactures
(Ocampo and Parra 2006). The paper connects these two phenomena  poor terms of trade
and weak institutions  by linking terms of trade to a countrys ability to abolish business
licensing systems that preempt competition and create ine¢cient monopolies.
The business licensing system has been a pervasive institution in many developing
countries. For example, in his New York Times best-seller Imagining India, Nandan
Nilekani (2008) reveals that from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, India employed a
licensing model for doing business that turned economic competition into a crooked wheel,
as bureaucrats who managed licences became the gatekeepers to industry (p.63). Nilekani
further argues that the licensing system created lazy monopolies, leading to economic
stagnation during that period. Although the adverse consequences of the licensing system
have been thoroughly analyzed in a seminal work by Parente and Prescott (1999), there has
been little discussion as to why it endures in some countries. We provide an explanation
for commodity exporters.4
Imagine a small open economy comprising three sectors, a household sector, a primary
sector and an intermediate good sector. Suppose the primary sector produces a cash crop
solely for export (for example cocoa, co¤ee, cotton) while the intermediate good sector
produces an intermediate good for the primary sector (for example herbicides, fertilizers,
hybrid seeds). Suppose also that this economy uses foreign exchange to pay for imports
of an essential industrial good (for example drugs, vaccines). Under balanced trade, the
4See Parente and Prescott (1999) for more detailed examples.
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countrys capacity to pay for its imports is limited by the value of its primary commodity
export. Thus, expanding production in the primary sector becomes critical for improving
living standards. This expansion may depend on the structure of the intermediate good
sector, which produces the intermediate good for the primary sector. Indeed, technological
change in the intermediate good sector can ensure an abundant supply of the intermediate
good, leading to an expansion of the primary sector. Why then has the intermediate good
sector of many commodity-exporting countries been plagued with institutions that impede
technological change?
Using a three-sector model along the lines described above, we show that such institu-
tional stagnation may be rooted in the terms of trade for primary commodities. Our model
articulates the link between the terms of trade and entrepreneurs incentive to coalesce 
into what we refer to as the business elite  to oppose free enterprise in the intermediate
good sector. In our model, only a self-seeking coalition of entrepreneurs blocking entry
of technologically superior potential rivals can prevent technological change. An entrepre-
neurs net gain from joining the business elite is given by the di¤erence between the benet
of membership (the sum of labor income and the monopoly rent from stiing competition)
and its opportunity cost (entrepreneurial income under free enterprise). A negative net
gain leads to free entry of technologically superior rivals. Otherwise, a business elite will
exist and lobby for the adoption of a restrictive licensing system.
Our model exhibits both strategic and non-strategic elements. Strategic elements nat-
urally create a game situation involving three stages. In the rst stage  the elite game 
each entrepreneur must decide non-cooperatively whether or not to commit to membership
of the business elite, if invited to join. The decision rule is based on the net gain from
opposing free enterprise. Only when this net gain is positive will a business elite opposed
to free enterprise emerge. The outcome of this game will thus determine the size of the
pool of prospective elite members. In the second-stage  the entry-deterrence game  pro-
vided entrepreneurs are willing to coalesce, the business elite strategically choose its size
to deter entry, while prospective entrants into the sector decide whether or not to allocate
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resources to breaking the elites resistance to free enterprise. The benets from member-
ship of the elite vary inversely with the elite size while the elite size required to deter
entry varies directly with prospective entrants technological power. In the third and nal
stage, a two-player, Cournot game ensues between the elite and the new entrant, provided
entry occurred earlier in the second stage. We require that the Nash equilibrium of this
institutional game be sub-game perfect, and derive necessary and su¢cient conditions for
the economy to reject the use of a licensing system in the intermediate good sector. We
show that under certain conditions, below a threshold terms of trade level, a coalition of
private agents will emerge and lobby against free enterprise. Above this threshold, no such
coalition exists, permitting institutional change.
The paper contributes to the debate on the relative merits of developing countries spe-
cializing in export of primary commodities versus manufactures as a development strategy.
This literature consists of two opposing groups. The rst  to which our paper belongs 
is pessimistic about the idea of a country basing its development strategy on export of pri-
mary commodities (Singer 1950; Prebisch 1950; Findlay and Kierzkowski 1983; Matsuyama
1992; Stokey 1996; Ocampo and Parra 2006). The other group is optimistic (Cartiglia 1997;
Echers 1999; Ranjan 2001; Dessy, Mbiekop, and Pallage 2009). Our contribution is to link
commodity terms of trade to the process of institutional change in a commodity exporting
country.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on institutions and development which links
economic stagnation to poor institutions. Parente and Prescott (1999) highlight monopoly-
rights arrangements in poor countries as the main barrier to their long term prosperity.
Baland and Francois (2000), Vicente (2006), and Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006)
emphasize the institutional foundations of economic stagnation in resource-rich countries.
Unlike the existing literature, we provide an explanation for the pervasiveness in some
countries of institutions that impede technological change, seen by many as the vehicle to
prosperity (Parente and Prescott 1999). On the whole, our main contribution is to integrate
the trade and development literature with the institutions and development literature, by
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linking terms of trade to institutional quality in commodity-exporting countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the model.
Section 3 discusses the model under a free enterprise institutional regime, while section
4 discusses it under a restrictive licensing system. Section 5 concludes while Section 6
contains proofs of the models main results.
2. Overview of the Analysis
In this section, we lay out the basic structure of our model. Consider a small open economy
with three sectors: a primary sector, an intermediate good sector, and a household sector.
All the primary sectors output is exported. The intermediate good sector produces an
intermediate good used as an input in the primary sector. The household sector comprises
a continuum one of ex ante homogenous households. Each household is endowed with one
unit of labor, and f units of a staple food. The staple food and a composite imported good
are the only consumption goods in this environment. We take the imported good as the
numeraire, and measure all other prices in units of this numeraire.
While the primary sector is perfectly competitive, the structure of the intermediate good
sector is endogenous to households choice of the institutional regime underlying entry
into this sector. A household derives income from selling labor to rms in the primary
or intermediate good sector; or from membership of the entrepreneurial class enjoying
protected monopoly rights over the use of a particular technology in the intermediate
good sector. There are two possible technologies for producing the intermediate good in
this environment, namely 0 and 1, with 1 > 0. The initial state of the economy is
characterized by the common use of the technology 0 in the intermediate good sector.
However new adopters may break into the industry by using the non-transferable superior
technology 1. We assume that entrepreneurs using the inferior technology 0 are aware
of this potential competition from new adopters, and may, in response, form a coalition
using political leverage to block entry of these new adopters. For instance, the coalition
can lobby the government to issue business licences only to its members, as was the case
4
in India during the period 1960 to 1990 (Nilekani 2008). In this paper, we refer to such a
coalition as the business elite or the elite for short.
The industrial organization of the intermediate good sector therefore depends on whether
there is an elite who opposes free enterprise in this sector. Let Ir 2 f0; 1g denote a scale
operator that takes the value Ir = 0 if the industrial organization of the intermediate good
sector is characterized by a licensing system (hereafter referred to LS), and Ir = 1 if it is
characterized by free enterprise (hereafter FE). Henceforth an asterisk () denotes FE, and
variables with no asterisk denote LS.
2.1. The Intermediate Good Sector
All rms in the intermediate good sector are owned by householdswho supply labor, the
only marketed production factor in this sector. Total output by the representative rm
using technology i is
Qix = iN
i
x; (2.1)
where N ix 2 [0; 1] denotes total labor used by the representative rm of type i, where
X
i=0;1
N ix  Nx:
Under LS, a business elite, when it exists, will strategically choose its size to deter
entry by any potential rm endowed with a superior technology 1. If entry occurs, the
industrial organization of this sector will correspond to a duopoly, with aggregate output
of the intermediate good given by:
Qx = 0N
0
x + 1N
1
x : (2.2)
Intersectoral labor mobility implies that rms in this sector will pay the primary sector
wage !, so that the prot of a representative rm of type i is
i = (pxi   !)N ix; (2.3)
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where px denotes the price of the intermediate good in units of the imported good. If entry
is deterred, then the industrial organization will be a monopoly, with total supply of the
intermediate good given by
Qx = 0Nx, (2.4)
and the monopoly rent will be given by
0 = (px0   !)Nx: (2.5)
We assume that this rent is equally shared among the Nx members of the elite, so that the
per capita monopoly rent, rc = 0=Nx, accruing to each member is
rc = px0   !. (2.6)
By contrast, under the FE institutional regime, perfect competition will drive away
low-technology rms, as an implication of the assumption of a constant return-to-scale
production process. In this case, aggregate output will be given by
Qx = 1N

x ; (2.7)
where Nx = 1   Na is a measure of the size of the intermediate good sector under FE.
The zero-prot condition under FE will thus generate the following pricing rule for labor
services:
! = px1. (2.8)
2.2. The Primary Sector
Firms in the primary sector are perfectly competitive. They combine the intermediate
good (Xa) and labor (Na) to produce A units of the primary product according to a CES
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technology given by
A = [ Xa + (1   )Na ]1= ; (2.9)
where  > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two factors, and  2 (0; 1),
the factor share parameter.
Let pa denote the export price for the primary commodity measured in units of the
imported good. Under the small-open economy assumption, pa is exogenous and can be
interpreted as the commodity terms of trade. Prot-maximization by perfectly competitive
rms yields the following factor pricing rules:
! = (1   ) pa

A
Na
1 
(2.10)
P (Ir) = pa 

A
Xa
1 
; (2.11)
where P (Ir)  Irpx+(1  Ir) px, and Ir indicates the institution underlying the industrial
organization of the intermediate good sector. Resource constraints in the primary sector
are the following:
Na  1  (1  Ir)Nx + IrNx (2.12)
Xa  (1  Ir)Qx + IrQx: (2.13)
Under market-clearing, the inverse demand function for the intermediate good is given by
P (Ir) = pa 

A
(1  Ir)Qx + IrQx
1 
; (2.14)
Ir 2 f0; 1g.
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2.3. The Household Sector
Each household has preferences over a staple food and an imported good m. The utility
(u) representing these preferences is additively separable in both goods:
u = f + m;  > 0 (2.15)
where  > 0 denotes the common utility weight households assign to the imported good.
A households earned income depends on (i) the industrial organization of the inter-
mediate good sector, and (ii) the sector of employment. Let yc denote the income of a
member of the elite, ync, the income of a non-member, and y, the income of a typical
household under FE. Let Ic 2 f0; 1g denote a scale operator that takes the value Ic = 1 if a
household is a member of the elite, and Ic = 0 if not. Each households budget constraint
is thus given by:
m  y (Ic; Ir) ; (2.16)
where
y (Ic; Ir) = (1  Ir) [(1  Ic) ync + ycIc] + yIr; (2.17)
with
yc = ! + rc (2.18)
ya = ! (2.19)
y = !: (2.20)
! and ! are the labor wages under LS and FE respectively, and rc, the per capita elite
rent under LS, conditional on being a member of the elite operating in the intermediate
good sector.
Given (Ic; Ir), we can therefore write a typical households indirect expected utility as
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follows, using (2.15) and (2.16):
V (Ir; Ic) =
8<
: f + y (Ic; 0) if Ir = 0f + y if Ir = 1 ; (2.21)
where
y (Ic; 0) =
8<
: ! if Ic = 0! + rc if I1 = 1 : (2.22)
2.4. Gains from Elites Membership
In this subsection we characterize the gains to a household from membership of the elite.
Clearly, as shown in (2.22), there is a rent premium for belonging to the elite. However, at
the economy-wide level, this rent has an opportunity cost under LS, as measured by the
forgone utility from blocking free enterprise. Therefore opposing free enterprise is rational
if and only if each elite member achieves a higher utility under LS than under FE.
Let us denote as # (Nx) the net gain to a household from belonging to the elite opposing
free enterprise in the intermediate good sector, when the optimal size of this elite club is
Nx. This net gain is the di¤erence between the value of belonging to the elite (i.e., V (0; 1))
and the value of being a wage earner under FE (i.e., V (1; 1)): # (Nx)  V (0; 1)  V (1; 1).
From (2.21), substituting in, (2.6), (2.18) and (2.20), we can write this net gain as follows:
# (Nx) = (px0   !) : (2.23)
Thus the condition # (Nx) > 0 is necessary for LS to be supported as a general equilibrium,
while # (Nx)  0 is su¢cient for free enterprise to be institutionalized. We are interested
in the nature of factors that can cause the inequality # (Nx)  0 to hold. For this purpose,
we compute !and px. We adopt a general equilibrium approach to characterizing these
variables, beginning with the determination of !, the equilibrium labor wage under FE.
9
3. Equilibrium under Free Enterprise
In this subsection, we dene and characterize a general equilibrium for this three sector-
economy under FE, i.e., for Ir = 1. In this context, both the primary and the intermediate
good sectors are perfectly competitive. Therefore, in the intermediate good sector, sur-
viving rms are those using the superior technology 1, so that total output is given by
(2.7).
Perfect competition will eliminate all rents and thus all households will earn the same
wage regardless of sector of employment. This common labor income satises the following
wage equalization condition obtained by combining (2.10) with (2.8):
! = (1   ) pa

A
Na
1 
= px1: (3.1)
A direct implication is that all households will enjoy the same level of consumption of the
imported good, which, from the budget constraint in (2.16), is given by m = y = px1.
Furthermore, under balanced trade, imports of the nal good must be paid for by
exports of the primary commodity. In other words, the following trade-balance condition
must be met in equilibrium:
paA = p

x1: (3.2)
The market for the intermediate good most also clear in equilibrium:
Xa = Qx: (3.3)
Given these equilibrium conditions as well as those pertaining to rms choice of inputs,
proving the existence and uniqueness of a general equilibrium under FE essentially amounts
to proving that there exists a unique relative price px that clears the intermediate good
market. We therefore prove the following proposition in the appendix section.
10
Proposition 1. Under the FE, a general equilibrium exists and is unique:
px =
 
 
1
1  +

(1   )
1
 1
1 
!(1 )=
pa; (3.4)
where pa denotes the terms of trade for the primary commodity.
Observe that labor income under FE is given by ! = 1px. Therefore Proposition 1
states that better terms of trade (i.e., a higher level of pa) drive up the labor wage under
FE. As an implication of Proposition 1, we can obtain the net gain to a household from
membership of the elite as follows, by substituting (3.4) in (2.23):
# (Nx) =
2
4px0  
 
 
1
1  +

(1   )
1
 1
1 
!(1 )=
pa1
3
5 : (3.5)
Expression (3.5) states that given px, the net gain to a household from from membership
of the elite is a decreasing function of the terms of trade for the primary commodity pa,
implying that better terms of trade may discourage the emergence of an elite with a vested
interest in opposing free enterprise in the intermediate good sector. However terms of trade
also a¤ect the monopoly price of the intermediate good px. Therefore, to obtain a complete
characterization of this net gain, we next compute the equilibrium level of px under LS.
4. Equilibrium under A Licensing System
Recall that under LS, the elite uses its political leverage to obtain protected monopoly
rights tied to the use of the inferior technology 0 by all rms in the intermediate good
sector. This coalition recruits its members among householdsthe labor suppliers. We
stated above that a necessary condition for any household to benet from membership of
the elite is that the inequality # (Nx) > 0 holds. An important feature of our model is that
the level of # (Nx) depends on both strategic and non-strategic elements. Strategic elements
underlie a game situation involving three stages. In the rst stage the elite game each
household decides non-cooperatively whether or not to commit to membership of the elite,
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if invited to join. This decision is based on the net gain # (Nx). In the second stage
game the entry-deterrence game the elite chooses its size Nx so as to deter entry by a
technologically advanced potential competitor. The latter then decides whether or not to
allocate a level of resource Nx to breaking the elites resistance to free enterprise. In the
third and nal stage, a two-player, Cournot game ensues between the elite and the new
entrant, provided entry occurred earlier in the second stage. We require that the Nash
equilibrium of this three-stage game be sub-game perfect. Therefore this game is solved
by backward induction, beginning with the post-entry game. Therefore an allocation of
households between the elite (with total population size Nx) and the non-elite (with total
population size 1 Nx) is supported as a general equilibrium only if # (Nx) > 0. Violation
of this condition will thus lead to free enterprise.
4.1. The Post-Entry Stage
This game is played in the third and nal stage between the elite and the new entrant,
given that entry occurred in the second stage. A players payo¤ under Cournot competition
is given by (2.3), where px is given by (2.14).
Using (2.1) and (2.14), we can thus write the payo¤s of both players as follows:
0
 
N0x ;N
1
x

=
"
A
0N0x + 1N
1
x
1 
0 pa   !
#
N0x ; (4.1)
for the business elite, and
1
 
N1x ;N
0
x

=
"
A
0N0x + 1N
1
x
1 
1 pa   !
#
N1x (4.2)
for the new entrant, where N ix denotes the number of workers hired by player i (i = 0; 1),
which we take as a proxy for the quantity produced by player i. The new entrants best
response to the elites hiring of N0x workers can thus be dened as
B
 
N0x

= argmax
N1
x
1
 
N1x ;N
0
x

; (4.3)
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which, by way of di¤erentiation of (4.2), can be characterized as the value of N1x that
equates the marginal revenue and the marginal cost of the new entrant:

A
0N0x + 1B (N
0
x)
1  
0N
0
x + 1B (N
0
x)
0N0x + 1B (N
0
x)

 !
 pa1
: (4.4)
Given the above characterization of B (N0x), we can re-write the new entrants duopoly
prot as follows using (4.2):
1

B
 
N0x

;N0x

=
"
A
0N0x + 1B (N
0
x)
1 
1 pa   !
#
B
 
N0x

: (4.5)
Expression (4.5) will prove useful for solving the second stage game.
4.2. Entry-deterrence Stage
In this stage, the game is again played between the elite and the potential entrant, as-
suming that there are households willing to join the elite that opposes free enterprise in
the intermediate good sector. Recall that rms in this environment are owned by workers.
Therefore, for the elite rms, the total number of workers they employ is taken as a proxy
for the elite size.
Since the potential entrant must incur a cost N0x to break the elites opposition to
free enterprise in the intermediate good sector, in this stage of the game, expression (4.5)
above gives the elite all the information needed to ascertain the implications of their choice
of size for the industrial organization of this sector. Indeed, to the extent that for the
potential competitor, expending own resources to break barriers to entry is rational only
when 1 [B (N0x) ;N
0
x ] > N
0
x after entry, the elite size N
0
x = Nx needed to e¤ectively deter
entry thus can be characterized as follows:
1 [B (Nx) ;Nx]  Nx; (4.6)
where B (Nx) satises (4.4). We refer to Nx as the optimal elite size.
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We combine (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6) to prove the following proposition in the appendix
section.
Proposition 2. Given (A; !),
(i) the potential entrants best response is given by
B (Nx) =  (!)Nx;
(ii) the optimal elite size is given by
Nx =

 1pa(!)
+ !(!)
1=(1 )
A
0 + 1(!)
; (4.7)
and
(!)  
2 (1  )!
"
+

+
4 (1  ) 0!
1
1=2#
: (4.8)
Equation (4.7) gives us the critical level of elite size necessary for the adoption of LS in
this environment. When that level obtains, the industrial organization of the sector takes
the form of a monopoly.
4.3. Existence of an Equilibrium under LS
Let us now characterize the non-strategic elements of this environment. Observe that since
entry is deterred under LS, the market for the intermediate good is a monopoly so that total
supply of the intermediate good is Qx = 0Nx = Xa, under market clearing. Furthermore,
in equilibrium, the human resource constraint must be satised: Na +Nx = 1. Therefore
combining (2.11) and (4.7), using Qx = 0Nx we can write the monopoly price of the
intermediate good px as follows:
px =
+ !(!)
1(!)

0 + 1(!)
0
1 
: (4.9)
Observe that px depends on ! which is endogenous. To complete the characterization
of the equilibrium level of the intermediate good price px, it therefore remains to determine
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the equilibrium level of ! under LS. We start with the determination of the equilibrium
level of exports of the primary commodity A.
Since 0Nx = Xa and Na = 1   Nx, in equilibrium, we can use (2.9) to establish that
total exports of the primary commodity are given by:
A = [ (0Nx)
 + (1   ) (1 Nx)]1= : (4.10)
Therefore, from (2.10), substituting in (4.10), rearranging terms yields the equilibrium
primary sector wage as follows: ! = W (pa; Nx), where
W (pa; Nx)  (1   ) pa
 
[ (0Nx)
 + (1   ) (1 Nx)]1=
1 Nx
!1 
(4.11)
Next, combining (4.7) and (4.10) yields the following xed-point problem:
Nx =

 1pa [W (pa; Nx)]
+ ! [W (pa; Nx)]
1=(1 )
[ (0Nx)
 + (1   ) (1 Nx)]1=
0 + 1 [W (pa; Nx)]
; (4.12)
where W (pa; Nx) is given by (4.11). For a large family of relevant parameters values
(;  ; 0; 1; ; pa), the xed-point problem in (4.12) is well-dened. Hence the following
denition:
Denition 1. A general equilibrium under LS is an elite size Nx such that
(i) Nx solves (4.12)
(ii) and
# (Nx) > 0: (4.13)
Conditions (i) and (ii) are necessary and su¢cient for the LS to be supported as a
general equilibrium. Given that the functions dening equilibrium variables are non-linear,
proving the existence of a solution to (4.12) is bound to be complicated. To investigate
su¢cient conditions for the economy to reject the LS institutional regime blocking economic
progress, it is more convenient to proceed through counterfactual simulations.
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4.4. Model Simulation
To illustrate the e¤ects of the primary commodity terms of trade on the quality of insti-
tutions, we simulate the model using numerical values derived from Parente and Prescott
(1999), except for , the elasticity of substitution between labor and the intermediate good
in the production of the primary commodity. In our model, the level of  is chosen so
as to ensure that the per capita monopoly rent rc dened in (2.6) is always non-negative.
Observe that by construction, the value of the parameter  has no determining inuence
on our results. Therefore its value can be normalized to unity, without loss of generality.
Table 1 below summarizes information about the levels or ranges of relevant parameters.
Table 1. Numerical values for relevant parameters
Preference intermediate good sector Farm sector
parameters parameters parameters
 = 1 0 = 3:00  2 f0:15; 0:23; 0:45g
1 = 5:00  = 0:31
 = 0:14 pa 2 (0; 1)
Counterfactual simulations thus yield a number of e¤ects associated with a secular change
in the terms of trade. We begin with the existence and uniqueness of the optimal business
elites membership size Nx.
4.4.1. Existence and Uniqueness of the Optimal Elite Size
In this subsection, we illustrate the existence and uniqueness of the optimal elite size Nx.
Fig.1 below plots the solution to the xed-point problem in (4.12) as a function of pa and
16
 , respectively.
Fig. 1. Optimal Elites Membership Size as a function of pa and  
In each of the three graphs of Fig. 1, the diagonal dotted line represents the 45o line.
The existence of a unique xed point for (4.12) is thus illustrated by the fact that each blue-
colored curve crosses the 45o line just once. Each of the three graphs in Fig.1 corresponds
to a di¤erent value of the terms of trade pa. For each of these graphs, there are three
blue-colored curves; and each curve corresponds to a di¤erent value for the relative share,
 , of the intermediate good in the production of the primary commodity.
Fig.1 suggests that increases in the commodity terms of trade (e.g., an increase from
pa = 0:5 to pa = 0:9) raise the minimum size Nx needed to provide the elite with e¤ective
political leverage to secure the use of a licensing system that blocks entry of more techno-
logically advanced competitors. Likewise, a higher (respectively, lower) relative share,  , of
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the intermediate good in the production of the primary commodity also raises (respectively,
reduces) the minimum elite size Nx.
4.4.2. The E¤ects of Terms of Trade on Per Capita Monopoly Rents
In this subsection, we investigate the determinants of the level of per capita monopoly rent
rc. From (2.6), substituting in (4.9), using !  W (pa; Nx), we obtain the per capita rent
accruing to each elite member as follows:
rc =
+W (pa; Nx) [W (pa; Nx)]
1 [W (pa; Nx)]

0 + 1 [W (pa; Nx)]
0
1 
0  W (pa; Nx) ; (4.14)
where Nx is solution to (4.12). Fig. 2 below is obtained by plotting expression (4.14) as a
function of the terms of trade for the primary commodity pa and the factor share  .
Fig. 2. Per capita monopoly rent rc as a function of pa and  
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Fig. 2 shows that the per capita monopoly rent rc has an inverted U-shape when
measured as a function of the commodity terms of trade pa. Indeed, there exists a threshold
terms trade level below which the per capita rent rises as terms of trade improve, and above
which it decreases with increases in the terms of trade. By contrast, per capita rent is a
monotonically decreasing function of the relative share of the intermediate good in the
output of the primary commodity  . This implies that, for each household, the incentive
to join the elite that opposes free enterprise in the intermediate good sector decreases with
the relative share of the intermediate good  .
4.4.3. The E¤ects of Terms of Trade on The Net Gain From Opposing FE
In this subsection, we close our discussion by investigating the e¤ects of terms of trade on
the net gain from committing to being a member of the business elite that opposes free
enterprise. From (4.11), we know that any equilibrium primary sector wage is given by
! = W (pa; Nx). As a result, from (3.5), substituting in (4.9) yields the net gain from
membership of the elite as follows:
# (Nx) =
2
4P (pa; Nx) 0  
 
 
1
1  +

(1   )
1
 1
1 
!(1 )=
pa1
3
5 ; (4.15)
where Nx is solution to (4.12) and px = P (pa; Nx), with
P (pa; Nx)  +W (pa; Nx) [W (pa; Nx)]
1 [W (pa; Nx)]

0 + 1 [W (pa; Nx)]
0
1 
: (4.16)
Equation (4.16) is obtained by substituting ! by W (pa; Nx) in (4.9).
Fig. 3 below is obtained by plotting expression (4.15) as a function of pa and  respec-
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tively.
Fig. 3. Net gain as a function of pa and  :
Fig. 3 shows that the net gain from membership of the elite is a monotonically decreas-
ing function of both the primary commodity terms of trade pa and the relative share of
the intermediate good  . In particular, when this relative share is su¢ciently small (i.e.,
  0:23), there exists a threshold terms of trade level below which the net gain from
membership of the elite is positive (respectively negative). Above this level the net gain is
positive.
In summary, Fig. 3 shows that two main conditions are necessary for a licensing system
leading to protected monopoly rights to be supported as a general equilibrium of a primary
commodity-dependent open economy:
(i) the economy must face poor commodity terms of trade (i.e., pa is su¢ciently low), and
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(ii) the relative share of the intermediate good in the output of the primary commodity  
must be su¢ciently low.
Violation of conditions (i) and (ii) together or of condition (ii) alone would establish free
enterprise as the institution underlying the industrial organization of the intermediate good
sector. In other words, given the level of  , improvements in the terms of trade are su¢cient
for a commodity-dependent economy to reject LS in favor of FE, while a su¢ciently high
 will ensure political support for free enterprise irrespective of the commodity terms of
trade.
5. Concluding Remarks
We have used a three-sector general equilibrium model to explore the role of terms of
trade in institutional stagnation in commodity-exporting countries. The main feature of
our model is the analysis of the political economy of institutional change in a context of
exogenous commodity terms of trade. Our analysis has articulated a three-stage game of
institutional change involving households, and a business elite and their potential competi-
tors. We have restricted institutional change to the intermediate good sector, and explored
su¢cient conditions for free enterprise to be institutionalized. Incorporating this political
economy dimension in a three-sector general equilibrium model allows us to analyze the
determinants of institutional change in the context of a small open economy specializing
in the export of primary commodities. We have shown that poor terms of trade may be
to blame for the inability of this type of economy to adopt institutions promoting tech-
nological progress. While institutions are important for all types of economic activity,
we have focused on the intermediate good sector following Parente and Prescott 1999,
and Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, because of the sectors critical importance to economic
development.
Our aim has been to highlight poor terms of trade as an issue in the debate on the causes
of economic stagnation in poor countries. Our paper complements the literature citing weak
institutions as a cause of economic stagnation by focusing on the case of countries basing
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their development strategy on specialization in primary commodity export. Our analysis
suggests that unless poor terms of trade are reversed, many such countries may continue
to face institutional and economic stagnation.
6. Appendix
In this section, we provide proofs of the results stated in the main text.
6.1. Proof of Proposition 1
We provide the proof to proposition 1 stating the existence and uniqueness of a general
equilibrium under FE. To show that an equilibrium exists and is unique, it su¢ces to
compute the equilibrium relative price for the intermediate good px. All other equilibrium
variables can then be computed using this value.
Let us begin with the determination of the equilibrium intersectoral allocation of house-
holds across sectors. As an implication of property (iii) of the general equilibrium, we
determine Na by solving the equation (3.1):
Na =

(1   ) pa
px1
 1
1 
A: (6.1)
We next use (2.7) and (2.11) in conjunction with (3.3) to determine Nx as follows:
Nx =

pa 
1 1 p

x
 1
1 
A: (6.2)
Next, use the balance trade condition in (3.2) to obtain A as follows:
A =

pa
1px

 1
: (6.3)
Note that the labor resource constraint is satised when Na + Nx = 1. Combining (6.1),
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(6.2), (6.3) with this resource constraint yields the following equation in one unknown:
(1   ) 11 

pa
px1
 
1 
+ (1 )
1
1 

pa
1px
 
1 
= 1:
Solving this equation for px yields the result (3.4). Clearly, under FE, a general equilibrium
exists and is unique.
6.2. Proof of Proposition 2
We compute the optimal coalition membership size Nx. By denition, it is the value of N0x
that solves the following equation:
1

B
 
N0x

;N0x

= N0x : (6.4)
Using (4.2), this equation becomes:
"
A
0N0x + 1B (N
0
x)
1 
1 pa   !
#
B
 
N0x

= N0x : (6.5)
Next, observe that the rst order condition in (4.4) can be written as follows:

A
0N0x + 1B (N
0
x)
1 
 pa1  !

0N
0
x + 1B (N
0
x)
0N0x + 1B (N
0
x)

: (6.6)
Substituting (6.6) into step (6.5) yields

!

0N
0
x + 1B (N
0
x)
0N0x + 1B (N
0
x)

  !

B
 
N0x

= N0x ;
which, re-arranging terms, leads to
(1  ) 1

B (N0x)
N0x
2
  
!
1

B (N0x)
N0x

  
!
0 = 0: (6.7)
Eq. (6.7) admits two roots
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b0 =
1
2 (1  ) 1


!
1 +
p


> 0
b00 =
1
2 (1  ) 1


!
1  
p


< 0;
where
p
 =

!
1
s
1 + 4
(1  ) 0
2 
!
1
>

!
1:
Therefore,
B (N0x)
N0x
= b0
is the unique solution, and the best response can be written as follows:
B
 
N0x

= (!)N0x : (6.8)
where
(!) =

2 (1  )!
"
+

+
4 (1  ) 0!
1
1=2#
:
Finally, from (6.5), substituting in (6.8), and re-arranging terms yields Nx as given in (4.7).
This completes the proof.
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